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“A Dimple in the Tomb”:
Cuteness in Emily Dickinson

angela sorby
“This is one of the reasons that people who don’t like Emily
Dickinson don’t like her, because she has this eternally cute,
kind of smirking cuteness about her, about so much of her work,
especially the better known work.”1
—James Dickey, 1972
“At first, I wanted nothing much to do with her. She was
like a relative I knew too well and was ashamed of. I found
her cuteness, in some lines of the poems of hers that I read in
school, at best weak, at worst cloying: ‘I like to see it lap the
Miles –’ (Fr383), ‘I’ll put a trinket on’ (Fr32)—not to mention
the ubiquitous ‘A Bird, came down the Walk –’ (Fr359). That
one annoyed me especially.”2
—Annie Finch, 2008

In one of Emily Dickinson’s early poems (Fr96), bees are
described as “Pigmy seraphs – gone astray – / Velvet people
from Vevay –.”3 They are small, they are lost, they are swathed
in fuzzy fabric, and they emit a charming Gallic buzz.4 There
is a word for these little insects from the French-speaking
part of Switzerland, and the word is cute. During the modern
era, as Emily Dickinson’s critical reputation rose, her pygmy
seraphs, elfin mushrooms (Fr1350, line 1), and chubbycheeked squirrels (Fr915, lines 9-10) became something of
an embarrassment. James Dickey, steeped in the gendered
aesthetics of the midcentury canon, cast Dickinson’s cuteness
as a function of her femininity, and her femininity as a
handicap. And even as feminists sought to affirm Dickinson’s
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status as a strong woman poet, they did so by minimizing
the cute factor; thus in her famous essay, “Vesuvius at Home”
(1976), Adrienne Rich dismisses Dickinson’s “kittenish” tone
as a false performance of “innocuousness and containment”
that hides the more authentic and volcanic Dickinson.5
Rich’s squeamishness (like Finch’s) makes sense given the
extent to which women poets have had to fight to be taken
seriously. In twentieth-century America, Emily Dickinson
could not be cute if she were to be powerful. To represent a
poet or a poem as cute was to feminize it, and to feminize it
was to diminish, objectify, or cheapen it.
Thanks partly to the battles won by second-wave feminists
such as Rich and Finch, it has become less obligatory
to cringe at the cuteness that pops up so frequently in
Dickinson’s poetry. In their pioneering study of Dickinson’s
humor, Susan Juhasz, Cristanne Miller, and Martha Nell
Smith note in passing that “Dickinson often calls attention
to her speaker and her subject as cute,” remarking that such
poems are “obviously designed to charm.”6 But if a charm is
a pretty trinket, it can also be a powerful spell. Even today,
cuteness remains a risky strategy for any female poet, critic,
or reader to embrace. Like sexiness, it sparks a physiological
flood that threatens to drown a poem’s more cerebral effects.
And like sentimentalism, it has often been associated with
low-prestige nurturing impulses.
Furthermore, cuteness is an unstable element: once
the pleasure rush has been delivered, the cute can quickly
turn cloying, creepy, or even repellent—a tipping point
described by the artificial intelligence researcher Masahiro
Mori as the uncanny valley.7 And, of course, the cultural
devaluation of instant gratification was already underway in
the nineteenth century, even as purveyors of popular culture
were learning how to elicit such emotional responses using
sentimental, sensational, and cute triggers. Thus, T. W.
Higginson—who in his preface to Dickinson’s 1893 Poems
likens her to Mignon, a Goethe character whose name
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means cute in French—elsewhere denigrates the use of the
word cute as one of many “small inelegancies” that “grate”
on the ears of cultivated men.8 More recently, the theorist
Sianne Ngai has discussed cuteness at length, stressing
its power to gratify even as she insists that “the cute” is
trivial —a small inelegancy—compared to major aesthetic
categories like “the beautiful” or “the sublime.”9
Dickinson, however, is nothing if not a risk-taker, and
in her poems, cuteness’ visceral power, affective instability,
and low prestige make it simultaneously dangerous and
useful. Dickinson uses cuteness to engage, not just with
conventionally fluffy animals, but also with insects, graves,
and corpses; with an endangered Protestant God; and with
questions of time, space, and scale. In this essay, then, I
will argue that the capacity to read for cuteness is a major
competency, not a minor deficit, and that by cultivating this
skill, readers can gain access to one of Dickinson’s many
powerful affective registers. Of course, not all of Dickinson’s
work is cute, but to argue that sophisticated readers should
never understand the poems in this way is to resist one of
the important avenues through which her poems engage
emotions. Cuteness can and indeed must be approached
through a number of disciplinary lenses, since it registers
an animal instinct with a strong cultural component. In
other words, cuteness must be simultaneously understood
as part of Emily Dickinson’s natural environment and as
one of her many historically-conditioned responses to that
environment.
Konrad Lorenz, the de facto founder of animal cuteness
studies, became famous for a series of photographs taken
during an experiment in which he convinced a brood
of ducklings that he was their mother, causing them to
follow him everywhere in a line. Like his predecessor
Charles Darwin, Lorenz was interested in the shared
affective experiences between humans and other animals.
Lorenz proposed that people—and many animals—are
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hardwired to respond to paedomorphic cues, including “a
relatively large head, predominance of the brain capsule,
large and low-lying eyes, bulging cheek region, short and
thick extremities, a springy elastic consistency, and clumsy
movements.”10 Cuteness, for Lorenz, is thus an “innate
releasing mechanism,” a kind of instinct spurring adults
to engage with youngsters and enabling them to build
beneficial relationships. In exchange for attention, food,
educational play, and social inclusion, babies (humans,
ducklings, puppies) offer adults a jolt of sensual, although
not precisely erotic, pleasure.11
Lorenz was a behaviorist interested in the so-called
nature/nurture debate, but the human cuteness response is
not just about maternal nurturing any more than the human
sexual response is just about procreation. While scientific
research into the functions of cuteness is ongoing, Gary
Sherman and Jonathan Haidt have recently theorized that,
although cuteness evolved in the context of mammalian
parenting, “it is not best characterized as a direct releaser
of caretaking behaviors, but rather as a direct releaser of
human sociality.” Pointing out that babies are cutest not
at birth (when they tend to be quite wizened) but around
five months old, they suggest that cuteness is meant to
reach as many adults as possible—not just parents—and
that it works to elicit play: physical play, linguistic play, and
the introduction of toys or transitional objects. Cuteness,
according to Sherman and Haidt, thus not only supports a
baby’s development; it also encourages adults to admit the
baby into a kinship circle, defined not necessarily by blood
but by a wider species-based sense of affinity.12
The human cuteness response is remarkably polymorphic.
Humans can find babies cute, but they can also find baby
ducks cute; they can find pictures of baby ducks cute; they
can find rubber ducks cute; and they can even find songs
about rubber ducks (without accompanying visuals) cute.13
Even human handwriting can be read as cute; the Japanese
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kawaii phenomenon—arguably the most hyperarticulated
cuteness subculture in world history—originated in
burriko ji, so-called Anomalous Female Teenage Writing,
a stylized, difficult-to-decipher form of lettering invented
by young girls.14 Among humans, then, cuteness is a primal
instinct, but one that is—again, like sexiness—subject to
intense and variable cultural mediation. And interestingly,
unlike sexiness, which has long excited the interest of
Western artists, cuteness was not a regularly sought-after
effect until well into the nineteenth century.
When Dickinson was born in 1830, the word cute (as
opposed to ’cute, a contraction of acute meaning clever)
was just beginning to circulate, and the verbal and visual
conventions of what would count as cute were still evolving.
Like the trajectory of the homosexual as traced by Michel
Foucault, the cute was comprised of concrete, episodic
instances (laughing babies, sportive kittens, funny turns
of phrase) before it became a named trait.15 By the midnineteenth century, the word was considered a colloquialism;
print sources suggest that, then as now, it tended to connote
adorable novelty along with some residual cleverness. For
instance, in T. H. Arthur’s 1841 story, “Other People’s
Children,” Mrs. Jones (mother of Angeline) brags about
her daughter to her neighbor, Mrs. Carter:
“Ha! ha! ha!” laughed out Mrs. Jones, as
something crossed her mind. “You ought
to have heard Angeline tell her dream this
morning. ‘What did you dream last night,
Anne?’ asked her father, when we were all
seated at the breakfast table. ‘I dreamed,
father, that we were all sailing in a steamboat
down in the bay, when a great whale, just like
a man, came up out of the water, and reached
out his arm to catch me. But didn’t I scream!’
‘Was that what made you cry out in the night
so?’ said her father. ‘Yes, sir,’ she said. ‘And
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how did you get off, Anne?’ asked her father.
‘O, I waked up, and then I was off ?’ Ha! ha!
Wasn’t that a cute answer for a child six years
old to make, Mrs. Carter?”16

Angeline is precocious but linguistically awkward; she
requires caretaking but also gives her parents pleasure and
amusement. By the mid-nineteenth century, coalescing
social forces—including liberal capitalism and the romantic
emphasis on the senses—were making cuteness into usable
aesthetic material, so that Mrs. Jones—via T. H. Arthur—
could name the source of her delight. In the more familiar
sentimental mode, a pallid, Christlike child (such as Harriet
Beecher Stowe’s Little Eva) invites sympathetic tears.
Sturdy little Anne, by contrast, makes the adults laugh; her
sudden self-redemption from the whale is entertaining, not
spiritually instructive.
Most of the critical work on cuteness thus far has
focused on its status as a liberal-capitalist commodity
aesthetic. As industrial economies began to generate a
substantial number of middle-class consumers, human
agency became bound up in new networks of consumption
and communication. As Karl Marx noticed in the 1840s,
new forms of commodity fetishism began blurring the lines
between desiring subjects and coveted objects. Sianne Ngai
traces and expands upon the commodity’s weird half-life
in her work on cuteness as a modern aesthetic category.
Ngai concludes, inter alia, that cuteness in both art and
commerce encodes an unstable power dynamic in which
humans imagine themselves overpowering, but also being
oddly overpowered by, anthropomorphic objects.17 Charles
Dickens, a Dickinson family favorite, adopted an early
version of this logic, sending cadres of cute characters across
the Atlantic, from the Infant Phenomenon in Nicholas
Nickleby (1839) to Jenny Wren, the doll’s dressmaker in
Our Mutual Friend (1865). As Lauren Byler has argued,
Dickens’ novels teem with characters made cute by their
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“distinguishing quirks, thingly quality, and generally
misshapen quaintness.” Byler suggests that cuteness is “a
mode of passive aggression” by which Dickens’s characters
“actively stage themselves as vulnerable little objects in
order to assert themselves and to fulfill particular desires.”18
Literary cuteness, in this view, is a symptom, staging (albeit
sometimes subversively) identities and relationships defined
by systems of domination.
Dickinson’s use of cuteness certainly registers her
awareness of systems of domination, especially in familial
and religious contexts. However, these very systems were
also changing in the wake of transatlantic romanticism—a
set of discourses that, by emphasizing internal sensations
and impulses, came to value the cuteness response as
an adjunct to creativity. Dickinson absorbed romantic
structures of feeling from multiple sources, but Friedrich
Schiller’s influential work on passion (the sense-drive),
reason (the form-drive), and the Spieltraub (the play-drive)
is particularly relevant here. Jed Deppman notes that,
while Dickinson probably encountered Schiller’s writings
through the Hedges translations in the Atlantic and through
Carlyle’s Life of Schiller (1825), Schiller’s influence, like that
of other German philosophers, was diffuse and pervasive
in her milieu.19 For Schiller, the passions (unleashed by
what Lorenz would call innate release mechanisms, such as
cuteness) are corporeal and compulsive, linking humans to
other animals. Reason, by contrast, operates in an abstract,
formal realm where independent decisions can be made
and ethical systems can be constructed. For Kant, reason
is paramount, but for Schiller, passion and reason must
inform one another, so that humans can be human, neither
brutish nor mechanically logical, navigating between
necessity and autonomy. This “being human” is not a fixed
state but a process that entails dwelling in what Schiller
calls freedom and what Dickinson calls Possibility. And
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for Schiller—as for Dickinson—one way to generate this
freedom/possibility is through play.20
Schiller posits aesthetic beauty as the bridge through
which passion and reason can reconcile, not by hardening
into a third, fixed state, but by being in constant play or
flux. Dickinson also engages with, and produces, beauty,
of course. But when she deploys cuteness, the terms shift
subtly; instead of producing an experience of the sublime,
or the transcendent, or the ethical, or any other standard
romantic outcome, cuteness sparks play and play sparks
relationships—which are, in turn, a form of play. In “A fuzzy
fellow, without feet –” (Fr171), for example, the speaker
meets a caterpillar:
A fuzzy fellow, without feet –
Yet doth exceeding run!
Of velvet, is his Countenance –
And his complexion, dun!

(lines 1-4)

Cuteness is not beauty: the caterpillar is attractive because he
is small and oddly-shaped (Look here! A novelty!). And yet
he is not repellent; his fuzz, like the new growth on a baby’s
head, invites the reader to touch it. The poem’s speaker feels
an affinity with him that crosses species-boundaries, and
like many cute animals since, the caterpillar finds himself
dressed up like a person—wrapped in a little swatch of
velvet. The velvet partly covers his “dun” skin, evoking a
surge of fuzzy fellow-feeling in the cute-competent reader.
The caterpillar may be “dun,” but he is not done; as
the poem begins, he too is just beginning to develop. The
speaker supports his growth through play, staging an infinite
drama in the grass and trees. The caterpillar responds
equally playfully, dropping “in plush / Opon the Passerby” (lines 7-8), who may be the speaker, the reader, or a
random stranger. The poem’s kinship circle gently enlarges
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to include anyone who is willing to play along, eschewing
mastery in exchange for multiple possibilities and surprises.
The caterpillar tries out different residences (tree? grass?),
outfits (velvet? damask?), and even genders (fellow? Lady?)
without settling into one place, because the point is the
process.
Just as the caterpillar’s body is cute, so too does the poem’s
language exhibit Lorenz’s “springy elastic consistency, and
clumsy movements.”21 Although, unlike the caterpillar, the
poem has visible feet, it totters; for example, line 16 does
not quite scan metrically: “You’d scarce recognize him!” The
poem’s archaisms—“doth,” “yclept”—also contribute to
its charming awkwardness (line 2, 17). This is Dickinson
half dressed up as Isaac Watts, whose busy bee, cute in its
own right, neatly spreads wax in a little cell.22 And yet, of
course, this poem is only playing at being a didactic Watts
song—a game that becomes clear in the poem’s closing
lines, when the speaker refuses to state a moral: “Who am
I,” the speaker asks coyly, “To tell the pretty secret / Of the
Butterfly!”(lines 18-20).
What is the butterfly’s secret? We may use the word
butterfly, but that is a human word, meant to render
experience as fixed and finite. Jane Donahue Eberwein
understands the butterfly as a figure that reverses
“industrious Yankee values,” and this makes some sense,
especially given its implicit relationship to Watts’ busy bee.23
However, I do not think this poem is just a flipped allegory
that elevates butterfly over bee. Rather, as the poem’s fuzzy
fellow releases palpable fellow-feeling in the reader, this
passing pleasure overrides the teleological aims of pro-bee
Calvinist convention and pro-butterfly Romantic pedagogy.
Of course, to reduce the enmeshed forces of Calvinism
and romanticism to bees versus butterflies is to evade the
complexities of both, but the poem’s aim is sensual, not
didactic or ideological. This sensuality is precisely why
the butterfly’s final secret is not voiced: what matters is a
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delightful, compact, changing body, rather than a retained
idea or lesson.
In this poem, the speaker casts herself as a careful
observer. Although she frames the objects of her attention
as cute, her words do not necessarily index her, much
less Dickinson herself, as cute. Thus, although certain
of Dickinson’s cute nature poems are sometimes called
childlike, the term can be misleading. The speaker in “A
fuzzy fellow, without feet –” is not particularly fuzzy (or
fuzzy-headed); on the contrary, she claims the authority of
precise naming granted to botanists and other neutral adult
observers. As Robin Peel has shown, Dickinson’s approach
to nature could be rigorously empirical.24 And yet, if the
poet’s voice is not childlike, neither is it fully scientific in
the modern sense, because it admits what mid-nineteenthcentury professional scientists (although not Darwin)
were busy excluding from their field: affective experience
in general, and cuteness in particular. By engaging with
cuteness, and modeling this engagement for the reader,
the poet’s speaker does not claim to master the butterfly’s
secret, but she does embrace the opportunity to feel
emotional affinities—fleeting but visceral moments when
the interspecies gap narrows.
Such
narrowing
is
sometimes
figured
as
anthropomorphism, but the term anthropomorphic implies
crystal-clear boundaries between the human and the animal.
Haidt and Sherman point out that the cuteness response,
by releasing sociality, encourages adults to “mentalize
agency,” drawing babies—who are, after all, fairly alienlooking—into the circle of moral actors.25 When the
cuteness response is extended beyond the human, it tends
to promote a highly affective form of anthropomorphism,
as fuzzy-fellow-feeling overwhelms any logical sense
of the boundaries between, say, humans and animals.
Colleen Boggs has outlined how Dickinson participated
in, while also revising, her culture’s use of animals as an
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educational “supplement to liberal subjectivity.”26
More
conventional
mid-nineteenth-century
texts
anthropomorphized animals to help people (children
especially) establish their humanity through interspecies
kindness, thereby appearing to break down, but ultimately
reinforcing, human-animal boundaries. This impulse is
closely related to the idea of the pathetic fallacy, first
introduced and bemoaned by John Ruskin in 1856.27 When
Dickinson uses the cuteness response, however, she is able
to maintain more open, less moralistic boundaries, creating
relationships that are not necessarily anthropomorphic in
the sense of imagining the nonhuman as human and the
human as stable and obvious. Part of the play of affections
involves unsettling individualistic identities.
In “Bee! I’m expecting you!” (Fr983), for example, Fly
writes a letter without identifying himself until the end,
so that the reader encounters the text’s familiar epistolary
features prior to the writer’s grotesque and spindly-legged
form. The poem opens by announcing the news of spring
in what Helen Vendler describes as the tone of a laconic
Yankee, before signing off :
You’ll get my Letter by
The Seventeenth; Reply
Or better, be with me –
Your’s, Fly.

(lines 9-12)

Vendler calls this poem “Aesopian,” but Boggs is right
to beware of readings that turn Dickinson’s animals into
didactic exemplars.28 This poem’s point is not its message,
but its affective structure: it is a poem about feeling longing.
But what is the relationship between the poem and the
fly figure? Fly’s identity remains elusive until the last line,
so that readers cannot focus on his body. Moreover, when
they read Fly’s signature, questions of scale arise that block
308

“A DIMPLE IN THE TOMB”

any easy anthropomorphic identification: How does a Fly
write? Is the paper so small that only a few words will fit,
resulting in awkward enjambments? It is hard to picture a
fly wielding a pen and it is also hard to find a fly cute. And
yet the poem is cute, not because Fly is cute, but because he
produces a cute (small, playful, engaging) letter. The poem
encourages readers to be most interested, not in Fly and Bee
as metaphors, but in the process of drafting and delivering
and reading a text. In other words, we might understand
“Bee! I’m expecting you!” as a poem playing at being a
letter—with part of the game dependent on the unstable,
nonobvious boundaries between entities: Bee, reader, Fly,
writer. The reader’s indulgence is ultimately sparked by the
one clear (laconic, telegraphic) available entity: the letter
itself. Just as one might anthropomorphize a bee, one might
also, as the Japanese practitioners of Anomalous Female
Handwriting discovered, anthropomorphize a text and
find it cute.29 The cuteness response thus helps the reader
imagine, briefly, that Dickinson’s verse is alive.
For Dickinson, then, cuteness can elicit feelings of
affinity that in turn spark moments of play—and these, in
turn, create further affinities. At the same time, as I noted
from the outset, the power dynamics of cuteness can be
vexed. Dickinson’s charming caterpillars (bats, sunbeams)
do not function independently of the midcentury social
world that made them imaginable. Within the limits of
“A fuzzy fellow, without feet –,” the caterpillar’s cuteness
makes him a protean actor in a drama that disrupts
discourses of anthropocentric scientism. And yet, such
hierarchical discourses pervaded Dickinson’s social world
as they do our own, so that to find people or animals cute
is to, at least potentially, objectify, belittle, or condescend
to them. As the cultural critic Daniel Harris put it in an
influential essay, “the aesthetic of cuteness creates a class
of outcasts and mutations, a ready-made race of lovable
inferiors whom both children and adults collect, patronize,
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and enslave.”30 To be cute is to risk disempowerment;
Dickinson signals her awareness of this dynamic in an early
letter to her brother Austin, who had apparently asked her
to write more straightforwardly:
I strove to be exalted thinking I might reach
you and while I pant and struggle and climb
the nearest cloud, you walk out very leisurely
in your slippers from the Empyrean and
without the slightest notice request me to get
down! As simple as you please! The simplest
of the simple—I’ll be a little ninny—a little
pussy catty – a little Red Riding Hood, I’ll
wear a Bee in my bonnet, and a Rose bud in
my hair, and what remains to do you shall be
told hereafter.31

Margaret Homans notes that this funny passage is a serious
reflection of, and on, the era’s skewed gender relations, in
which men were exalted and women were infantilized.
Perceptively, however, Homans goes on to argue that
this passage outlines “what will become, strangely, a
serious program of poetry-writing,” in which Dickinson
embraces bees and bonnets, renouncing (or ironizing) lofty
patriarchal diction while attempting to build poetic power
and authority from a feminized subject position.32
Is this possible? Can a “little pussy catty” be taken
seriously, or must she always be trapped in Harris’ “readymade race of lovable inferiors”?33 In Dickinson’s letters,
the evidence is mixed. As T. W. Higginson’s framing of her
letters in the Atlantic Monthly suggests, when she posed
versions of herself as a “little shape,” “a minute host,” or an
“obedient child,” she engaged Higginson but also risked his
condescension.34 Higginson’s understanding of Dickinson
became increasingly complex as their correspondence
unfolded, but even in retrospect, when he published
her posthumous letters, he called her “quaint” as well as
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“cultivated,” and the label stuck, as documents from her
reception in the 1890s reveal.
Unpacking the extensive scholarly discussion of
Dickinson’s textual boundaries is beyond this essay’s scope,
as is discerning the extent to which her letters are poems
and her poems are lyrics. For Dickinson, both poems and
letters can be forms of play. However, Dickinson’s letter to
Austin reflects a larger interpersonal relationship, the terms
of which Dickinson could not control. If a poem, by contrast,
is a letter to the world that can (perhaps fortunately) not
write back, then its ludic capacities expand, precisely because
the poet sets the rules of the game. Dickinson’s poems
draw from her cultural moment while reworking or even
ignoring existing power relations. Thus, even as cuteness
became a public commodity aesthetic, Dickinson arranged
her poems to generate complex, private effects that did not
necessarily replicate the dominant culture’s terms.
In midcentury America’s dominant culture, cuteness
was starting to sell. One of the first Americans to monetize
cuteness was P. T. Barnum, who, in the 1850s, understood
that people, women especially, would pay to see cute babies
in “baby shows.”35 By 1863, Barnum further cashed in on
cuteness, hatching a plan to wed the 40” tall Charles “Tom
Thumb” Stratton to another little person, Lavinia Warren.
In February of 1863, Harper’s Weekly arrived next door at
Austin’s house, its war news displaced from the lead story
position and its cover emblazoned with a full-page etching
of the spectacle. Harper’s Weekly offered a blow-by-blow
of the “pigmy” couple’s nuptials, which were witnessed
not by guests, in the traditional sense, but by hordes of
mostly female spectators who had purchased tickets from
Barnum.36 The “mimic miniature Adam and Eve” then
set off on a wedding tour of the East Coast, including six
ticket-only “receptions” in Springfield, as the Springfield
Republican breathlessly reported.37
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Lori Merish sees the Tom Thumb wedding as a key
moment in the history of nineteenth-century cuteness
and commodity aesthetics. She argues that the “freak
show” tradition had an uncanny, magical quality that a
cute spectacle like Tom Thumb’s wedding tamed in favor
of “assimilating the ‘freak’ into a familial and familiar
structure of domination and hierarchy.”38 Mass-cultural
cuteness, for Merish, is thus a tool of gendered and racial
normativity; a way to discipline women into patterns of
public consumption that felt conventionally domestic.
There is no evidence that Dickinson succumbed to Tom
Thumb fever; even the earlier hoopla surrounding Barnum’s
Jenny Lind seems to have made the class-conscious
Dickinsons uneasy.39 However, her poems are not immune
to the attractive power of “mimic miniature” Adams and
Eves. For example, “Some Keep the Sabbath Going to
Church” (Fr236) enacts a ceremony that is scaled to fit
bobolinks; that is, about 1:12 scale, or standard dollhouse
size:40
Some keep the Sabbath going to Church –
I keep it, staying at Home –
With a Bobolink for a Chorister –
And an Orchard, for a Dome –

(lines 1-4)

An apple tree (or even several, joined at the top) is not as tall
as a church dome, and of course, a bobolink is smaller than
a human chorister. This scene’s slight physical awkwardness
(how, exactly, does the speaker don wings?) is part of its
cuteness, and its cuteness matters because the orchard
dome has not achieved heaven’s awful perfection and fixity.
Dickinson creates an environment that is not just small,
but one that also calls attention to its miniaturism as a key
feature of its power. Susan Stewart speculates that “the
miniature represents closure, interiority, the domestic, and
313

angela sorby

the overly cultural,” while the gigantic represents “infinity,
exteriority, the public, and the overly natural.”41 And yet, as
I have argued, to play is to unsettle fixity: a small space (a
dollhouse, an orchard) can be the site of a game that does
not end.
This orchard is not a transcendental microcosm of
an abstract, sublime macrocosm; it is defiantly imperfect,
embodied, and earthbound. The poem concludes: “Instead
of getting to Heaven at last / I’m going all along” (lines 1112), signaling, as Victoria Morgan argues, that “relation to
the divine” is achieved not through telos, but through the
present’s “chaotic multiplicity.”42 To be en route to heaven
is not to arrive; the poem is structured not as a Christian
eschatological narrative but as a form of ludic space. “Some
Keep the Sabbath” depicts a world of process-oriented
evolution and—as Asa Gray put it in his 1860 Atlantic
review of Darwin—of “analogical inference which ‘makes
the whole world kin.’”43 And, as Darwin himself would
point out in his 1873 study, The Expression of the Emotions
in Man and Animals, kin might struggle, red in tooth and
claw, for power, but the capacity to survive, develop, and
adapt is also contingent on our ability to compensate for
our early—and to some degree—lifelong helplessness
through the cultivation of emotional bonds.44 To be
small is to depend on others, and rather than being just a
disempowered condition, smallness here, as in the natural
world, invites the formation of interdependent, interspecies
bonds that comprise a contingent but emotionally vivid
version of paradise. Power is kinship, and kinship is felt.
Gray ends his 1860 review of Darwin by admitting
that the notion of interspecies kinship “discomposes” him
because of its theological implications.45 What troubled
nineteenth-century readers of Darwin also troubles this
poem: Where does God fit in? Neither distant, stately
lover nor mechanical telescope, this God operates on a
reduced and none-too-stately scale. The fierce God of
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Dickinson’s Calvinist forebears could not be seen as cute,
but a midcentury clergyman (such as the model curate in
Dickens’s Sketches By Boz [1836]) might be.46 As a “noted
clergyman,” God comes as close as possible to the human
circuit of play and affection, where he is the object of the
speaker’s gaze, and vulnerable—as preachers in Dickinson’s
orbit so frequently were—to her wry humor (Fr236, line
9). As a “mimic miniature” deity, he can be at least partway
admitted into the speaker’s kinship circle, “assimilating the
‘freak,’” as Merish puts it, into a familial structure. Instead of
reproducing hierarchical systems, however, the poem’s little
ceremony stages new possibilities, including the possibility
of an earthly heaven that is not ruled by any one power,
because it is a game—a nimble improvisation—rather than
a system.47
Even in “Some Keep the Sabbath,” however, God is
only potentially doted upon, not doting. He is, as Schiller
might put it, not human because he cannot play. In all of
Dickinson’s poems, God proves to be utterly incapable of
the cuteness response. Over and over again, adorable sayings
and doings are offered up to a deity that cannot coo or
dandle or tickle. Industrious angels (Fr245), a little gentian
(Fr520), wriggling worms (Fr932), a naughty girl in a stained
apron (Fr271): these images might captivate a reader, but
they cannot charm God. Emotional triangulation ensues,
as in “Of Course – I prayed” (Fr581):
Of Course – I prayed –
And did God Care?
He cared as much as on the Air
A Bird – had stamped her foot –
And cried “Give Me” –

(lines 1-5)

The cute-competent reader, confronted with the image of
a petulant bird stamping its foot, is engaged and amused.
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Insofar as the bird appeals, its charm is physical: It is small
and it talks! Who could resist? But nothing moves God,
who counts every sparrow but can’t seem to delight in them.
By the poem’s end, the cute bird dissolves into abstract
atoms and the speaker abandons her appeal, retreating
into “smart Misery” (line 11). The drama of socialization
has failed, but the principal flawed actor is not the speaker
or the bird, but God, who is not cute-competent, although
he is presumably smart in other (more miserable) ways.
Including a cute bird in the first stanza does not trivialize
the poem or the speaker; rather, to echo Gray, by an
“analogical inference which ‘makes the whole world kin,’”
Dickinson aligns herself emotionally with the bird and
with the reader, positing God as an unnatural and perhaps
even irrelevant outsider. Creatures suffer not because God’s
Godlike omnipotence fails, but because he is not sufficiently
human.48 If, as Lorenz suggests, beauty connotes symmetry
while cuteness connotes asymmetry,49 then God is beautiful
and can appreciate beauty because he is perfect, but for this
same reason, he can neither be cute nor appreciate cuteness.
As Dickinson wrote to Higginson, commenting offhandly
on the paradox of incarnation, “To be human is to be more
than divine, for when Christ was divine, he was uncontented
until he was human.”50
Cuteness, as I have suggested, sparks moments of play—
and God consistently drops the ball, as in “I know that He
exists” (Fr365), when the speaker attempts to posit him as a
kindly parental figure:
I know that He exists.
Somewhere – in silence –
He has hid his rare life
From our gross eyes.
’Tis an instant’s play –
’Tis a fond Ambush –
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Just to make Bliss
Earn her own surprise!
(lines 1-8)

The trouble is serious: God violates the rules of hide-andseek by extending the game indefinitely, which makes it
not hide-and-seek, and indeed not a game at all. Rather,
the play “prove[s] piercing earnest” (line 10) as death
approaches and the speaker realizes that she has been
abandoned. All of her suppositions about “a fond Ambush”
are wrong (line 6). Thus, as Eberwein puts it, “the initial
jollity of the celestial hide-and-seek game gives way to
fear either of God’s indifference to the seeker … or even
worse of the supposed hider’s nonexistence, which makes
a mockery of the quest.”51 God isn’t playful like a father;
indeed, throughout Dickinson’s oeuvre, he just plain can’t
play. He is, to put it another way, joylessly fixed and literal,
so that when humans try to capture him through metaphor
(What if God were a cat? What if God took a nap?), He
simply recedes from view.
If God lacks the cuteness response that would
enable him to play appropriately, humans risk social
inappropriateness for the opposite reason: our cuteness
response is promiscuous. In her poems about death,
Dickinson exploits this affective flexibility, inviting the
reader’s cuteness response before repelling it, releasing
urges to nurture, play, or communicate, that cannot be fully
satisfied (although, weirdly, they can be partly satisfied)
by corpses, graves, and postmortem images. One version
of this dynamic emerges in “She lay as if at play” (Fr412),
whereby a corpse takes on the look of a partly-living doll:
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Her dancing Eyes – ajar –
As if their Owner were
Still sparkling through
For fun – at you –
(lines 9-12)

This poem describes how the cuteness response can
misfire, and its effect is to underline, not the dead body’s
grotesqueness, but the grotesqueness of the living person’s
longing. The dead child is no longer human, but her cute
face (corpse? photograph?) continues to invite the playdrive. And yet, “She lay as if at play” tips its hand in the
first line; we know this child is dead, so the poem works less
as a visceral enticement than as a philosophical meditation
on the fixity of death versus the mobility of cuteness. Like a
postmortem photograph (eyes closed, pupils painted on the
lids), this image dips into the uncanny valley and ultimately
reinforces death’s finality.
In other poems, Dickinson ambushes readers with cute
images that partially reanimate the dead, so that the cutecompetent reader finds herself playing with graves and
corpses. The dead are drawn halfway back into the kinship
circle, but the play is entirely one-sided now: it cannot
generate the kinds of affective exchanges that nourish living
relationships. Dickinson starkly acknowledges this loss in
“In thy long Paradise of Light” (Fr1145), which reads in its
entirety:
In thy long Paradise of Light
No moment will there be
When I shall long for Earthly Play
And mortal Company –

And yet, although (as she would put it elsewhere) “recess
never comes” to paradise (Fr437, line 6), Dickinson places
playful decoys in many of her death poems. The grave is
figured as a cottage equipped with a tea set in “The grave
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my little cottage is” (Fr1784, line 1); a life is extinguished
by “a Gnat’s minutest Fan” (Fr415, line 14); the cemetery
is a “Curious Town,” overrun with squirrels (Fr1069, line
9); the corpse is buried “just a Daisy deep” (Fr424, line
8); the dead even hang Christmas stockings, albeit at an
altitude too high for “any Santa Claus to reach” (Fr344, line
19). Such decoys, insofar as they are cute, can trigger the
reader’s urge to touch, nurture, and play—all urges that are
impossible to suppress and impossible to indulge, and yet
serve as a (pretend, but felt) bridge between the living and
the dead.
The dead speaker in “I think the longest Hour of all”
(Fr607) ends a meditation on time with movement through
space:
Then I – my timid service done –
Tho’ service ’twas, of Love –
Take up my little Violin –
And further North – Remove –

(lines 17-20)

The speaker’s “little Violin” seems curious; the poem does
not otherwise frame the speaker as a musician, so its final
image comes as a surprise. And yet, the violin animates the
speaker at the moment that the speaker herself departs:
a little violin is meant to be played. This is precisely the
relationship that can no longer obtain, and yet the “little
Violin” is offered up as a stand-in for a real object, a toy
that can be taken up as if at play. The cuteness response
animates the timid speaker and her violin without reviving
them. Possibilities continue to be imaginable even as death
forecloses upon them.
Insofar as cuteness gives readers a jolt of pleasure,
Dickinson’s death poems cater to, and manipulate,
the cuteness response much as gothic texts exploit the
magnetism of necrophilia. Finding death cute (like finding
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it sexy) enables the poet to explore questions about death
from a visceral point of view that implicates the reader in
his or her own humanity, as in the brief poem, “A Dimple
in the Tomb” (Fr1522), originally included in a letter to T.
W. Higginson following the death of his infant daughter:52
A Dimple in the Tomb
Makes that ferocious Room
A Home –

In the context of the letter, the poem was clearly meant—
and surely would have been taken—to be consoling. But a
dimple, that quintessentially cute baby feature, depends on
chubby limbs or a smiling face. If adults melt at the thought
of a dimple, they cannot follow through with a pinch to
this dead baby’s leg or cheek. “A Dimple in the Tomb” thus
consoles, not by implying that the baby is in an abstract,
better place, but by empathetically reproducing the grieving
parent’s intense physical longing for the infant’s body.
Ultimately, this unquenchable desire represents the
double-edged sword of mediated cuteness: the poem
generates feelings of pleasure, proximity, and kinship, but
readers cannot take the natural next steps: vocalizing,
feeding, cuddling, engaging in two-way play. A dimple,
a squirrel, or a little violin cannot subdue death, but they
can extract from the reader a nurturing impulse. This
incapacity is frustrating, of course, but it is also a generative
advantage: once the reader’s sensual desire is aroused, the
poet can redirect that desire into the poem’s demands and
complexities. Once the reader’s attention has been captured,
emotionally and physically, the cute image has done its
work and the poem can begin to engage, on a human scale,
with questions (what is death? why do we die?) that are
too remote for humans to fully grasp. In this way, the dead
work like dolls that appear, at first glance, to be capable of
interaction. It turns out they can’t walk or talk, but it is still
possible—and tempting—to play with them.
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FFF

Dickinson’s edgy deployments of cuteness were unusual
in the 1860s, and cuteness would remain an underutilized
strategy in so-called high art (although not in popular
culture) throughout the twentieth century—with notable
exceptions, as Ngai’s work on Gertrude Stein suggests.53
In the twentieth century, cuteness was widely deployed by
top-down pop cultural forces such as Hallmark and Disney.
I do not disagree that cuteness can be cynically harnessed
to serve neoliberal economic agendas, and it is certainly
true that the concept of cuteness coevolved with Western
market economies—as did many other concepts, such as
the gothic, the sublime, and the sentimental. However, to
collapse one of the most ancient and basic human drives
into a story about marketing Tom Thumb is to radically
underestimate its power. Cuteness can be harnessed for
commodification, but this need not be its sole function.
Moreover, the twentieth century is history, and as the
media scholar Anthony McIntyre has argued, “cuteness
is emerging as one of the dominant aesthetic categories
of the twenty-first century.”54 Our twenty-first-century
moment manufactures and circulates endless iterations of
cuteness, particularly via the Internet. Dickinson, too, is
on the Internet, and her web poems, as Virginia Jackson
puts it, “partake, by the virtue of their medium, of the new
time frame of Web discourse: a text available at a click,
an illusion of simultaneous production and reception, a
public world of individual access.”55 Scholarly attention to
Dickinson’s material production(s) has been facilitated by
the online availability of her original texts, which are, of
course, digital. While, in one sense, sites like the Houghton
Library’s Emily Dickinson Archive return Dickinson to her
handmade historical context, they also place this entire
context in the larger and more seductive framework of
the web. That is, if Dickinson’s handwriting, marginalia,
and jagged envelope tears put pressure on the meanings of
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her poems, so too must the weirdly boundless text of the
Internet itself.
And the Internet, as D. E. Wittkower has argued, is
ruled by cats.56 Or, to elaborate more fully, the Internet has
become dependent on capturing the attention of distracted
viewers, and to do so, it draws most heavily on two basic
instincts: the sexual response (porn) and the cuteness
response (animals, babies, and baby-animal memes).
The web environment offers anecdotal examples of what
currently counts as cute: cross-species bonding, animals
dressed in human clothes, novel animals, and animals
performing humanlike activities.57 While it might seem
like a wild historical leap to suggest that analogous scenes
with analogous effects occur in Dickinson poems, the
parallels are undeniable. The difference, of course, is that
animal memes are not typically linked to complex artistic
experiments that make demands on audiences.
However, if in the twenty-first century cuteness is
sometimes just clickbait, proliferating and democratizing
forms of media have also made it available to amateurs and
artists with more complicated agendas. Japanese artists,
inspired by anime and manga, such as Takashi Murakami,
are engaged with destigmatizing cuteness and exploring its
expressive possibilities.58 Insofar as the lens through which
we view Emily Dickinson is necessarily contemporary and
global, it makes particular sense, in the twenty-first century,
to accede to her cuteness as a generative aspect of her art
and as an aspect of her implicit feminist edge. To return
to the quotes that launched this essay: perhaps now, in the
twenty-first century, there is nothing necessarily “smirking”
or “weak” or “cloying” or “annoying” about the image of
little mice tucked “Snug in Seraphic Cupboards / To nibble
all the day” (Fr151, lines 7-8). Perhaps to find (some of )
Dickinson’s poetry cute is to read it competently; when
fully engaged, the cuteness response helps readers to “dwell
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in Possibility” (Fr466, line 1) as embodied, playful, and
interdependent participant-observers.
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